

TOP SECRET

24 August 1960


Copy No. C *Ed-3*



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 47
TO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
CLASS. CHANGED TO: YS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: NR 10-2
DATE 9 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:



State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200470001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200470001-2

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: Vyacheslav Molotov's appointment to head the Soviet mission to the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna ends repeated efforts by the Soviet Government to find a new job for the former foreign minister. Molotov has served as ambassador to Outer Mongolia since Khrushchev's victory over the Malenkov-Molotov-Kaganovich "anti-party presidium group" in 1957. Earlier Moscow reportedly attempted to assign Molotov as ambassador to Argentina, Finland, the Netherlands, and Greece. Moscow has not yet named a successor to Molotov in Ulan Bator, a post that has become more sensitive in view of recent tensions in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet mission to the IAEA has limited itself to housekeeping functions carried out between the annual general conferences of the agency. Molotov's appointment does not require approval of the Austrian Government. OK

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Somalia-Ethiopia: Following a series of armed incidents between Somali tribesmen and Ethiopian security forces, the prime minister of the newly independent Somali Republic told the American ambassador on 20 August that he intended to request US arms. A Somali Government official reported that Ethiopian forces--allegedly equipped with US-supplied arms--are carrying out reprisals against Somali tribesmen for their alleged derailing of an Ethiopian train in early August. The Communist-influenced Greater Somalia League (GSL) and other extremist groups, as well as several members of the National Assembly, are planning immediate protests and demonstrations at the Ethiopian Consulate General and the American Embassy. OK

25X1

25X1

South Korea: The new government which Prime Minister Chang Myon has formed, largely from his faction of the Democratic party, is not strongly based. Chang controls slightly less than half of the ruling party's members in the House of Representatives, and his opponents, having rejected his offer of cabinet posts, have announced their intentions to form an opposition party--presumably with the objective of forcing the new cabinet from power. The factional conflict is basically the result of personal rivalries rather than policy differences, and continued maneuvering for personal advantage could undermine confidence in the post-revolution leadership. [REDACTED] (Page 2)

OK

25X1

III. THE WEST

25X6

Dominican Republic: The Dominican radio El Caribe announced on 23 August that it has opened negotiations for the services of TASS in order to help counter "imperialist interests opposing the Dominican people." The Dominican radio's bitterly anti-US and sometimes pro-Castro and pro-Soviet diatribes are almost certainly threats by dictator Trujillo in an attempt to bring pressure on the United States. Although Trujillo is apparently attempting primarily to convince the United States that any

OK

24 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

alternative to his control would be a pro-Castro regime, he is believed capable of attempting to align his regime with Castro or even with the Soviet bloc. Moscow is likely to be very cautious in responding to such overtures, especially in view of the unanimity of Latin American opinion against the Dominican Republic as expressed in the OAS. [REDACTED]

25X1

LATE ITEMS

*Republic of the Congo: Katangan President Tshombé has seized upon Lumumba's retreat from his attacks on the UN to express "confidence" in the UN and to reiterate the independence of Katanga. Tshombé probably regards the Security Council consensus as strengthening his hand with respect to Lumumba; his statement that he has "consulted" with anti-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congolese confederation suggests that he still favors confederation as the most acceptable resolution of the Katanga crisis.

According to press reports from Elisabethville, the 566-man Mali UN contingent in northern Katanga have become involved in fighting apparently stemming from activities by pro-Lumumba, anti-Tshombé tribesmen. Should tribal violence spread, the position of the Tshombé government would be badly undermined.

Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia reportedly will take favorable action on an anticipated Congolese request for several hundred secondary schoolteachers.. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

*Laos: Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi, leader of the counter-coup forces, appear to have agreed on 23 August to a set of broad principles which will govern their efforts to reach a settlement.

25X1

25X1

The success of the delicate negotiations still required for a definitive settlement will depend in large part on the ability of General Ouane and other senior army officers to bring Captain Kong Le under control. To date, their efforts in this direction have met with little success.

25X1

Meanwhile, Prince Souphannouvong, leader of the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat party, has issued an appeal over the Pathet Lao radio for all Laotians to support the Souvanna regime.

25X1

Somali Republic to Request US Arms

Prime Minister Abdirascid of the newly independent Somali Republic informed the American ambassador on 20 August of his intention to request US arms following a recent intensification of armed clashes between Somali tribesmen and Ethiopian security forces. The most serious of these clashes involved concentrated reprisal attacks by Ethiopian troops--allegedly equipped with arms supplied by the US under Mutual Security arrangements--against Somali tribesmen believed to have derailed an Ethiopian train in early August.

Public opinion in the republic is running high against Ethiopia and also against the US for supplying arms to Ethiopia while refusing to provide military assistance to the Somali Government. Somalis are particularly incensed over the recent delivery to Ethiopia of US jet fighter aircraft, which are rumored to have been involved in the recent attacks on Somali tribesmen. A report from Addis Ababa, however, indicates that Swedish-made piston aircraft were involved in the strafing missions against Somali villages.

Nevertheless, the Communist-influenced Greater Somalia League (GSL) and other extremist groups--as well as several members of the National Assembly--are planning imminent protest demonstrations against the American Embassy and the Ethiopian Consulate General. The pro-Western Somali police commandant believes the demonstrations will be kept under control, and the minister of interior has indicated he will attempt to limit them to Ethiopia's establishment. The American ambassador, however, believes that the Abdirascid government--despite its professed pro-Western orientation--will permit a demonstration and possibly lead it in order to protect itself from opposition attack.

25X1

New South Korean Cabinet

The new South Korean Government, which Prime Minister Chang Myon has formed largely from his faction of the Democratic party, is not strongly based. Chang controls slightly less than half his party's two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives, and his factional opponents, having rejected his offer of cabinet posts, have announced their intention of forming an opposition party--presumably with the objective of forcing the new cabinet from power. However, the prime minister's constitutional authority to dissolve the lower house and call new elections after a vote of no confidence may act as a restraining influence on the opposition.

The factional conflict in the Democratic party basically is the result of personal rivalries rather than policy differences. Most of the new cabinet members are long-time supporters of Chang and, like him, are believed to be friendly toward the United States. The new minister of finance, however, has on occasion been critical of American aid and other policies in South Korea. The new defense minister, who presumably will be responsible for carrying out the Democrats' campaign pledge to cut back military manpower, already has been criticized for his lack of experience in military affairs.

Prolonged factional strife for personal power could undermine public confidence in the post-revolution leadership and eventually result in expressions of resentment against the United States. Many South Koreans appear to expect an increase in American aid as a mark of Washington's approval of their new leaders. At the same time, there has been a marked increase in local press criticism of alleged attempts by the United States to interfere in South Korean domestic affairs. Some politicians may attempt to further their own personal interests by exploiting such issues as aid and Seoul's long-time desire for a status-of-forces agreement with the United States.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200470001-2

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200470001-2

Reaction to OAS Sanctions Against Trujillo Regime

Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo has reacted with characteristic vindictiveness to the OAS foreign ministers' vote to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions against his regime. He is permitting the controlled press and radio to attack the United States, which he blames for the OAS action. Some of this propaganda is clearly pro-Castro and pro-USSR.

The Dominican radio El Caribe announced on 23 August that it has opened negotiations for the services of TASS in order to help counter "imperialist interests opposing the Dominican people." There are also indications that Trujillo may be seriously considering an attempt to align his regime with the Soviet bloc. Moscow would probably respond to any Dominican overtures with caution, especially in view of the unanimous Latin American condemnation of the Trujillo regime. A leading dissident in the Dominican Republic told the American Embassy on 22 August that the dictator's son, now in Europe, wants to visit Moscow, and a Dominican consul in Europe expects Trujillo to ally himself with Castro.

Although Trujillo appears to be primarily attempting to convince the United States that any alternative to his control would be a pro-Castro regime, he also seems determined that if he falls he will have revenge on the United States by leaving a heritage of anti-US, pro-Castro strength in the country. His toleration of a small pro-Castro opposition party, which has been very active in recent weeks, suggests that Trujillo may expect that group to be the only functioning party in the country if he should be forced out. Middle-class professional groups, strongly anti-Castro, have borne the brunt of opposition to Trujillo, but have been ruthlessly suppressed.

Elsewhere in Latin America, initial reaction to the OAS decision on the Trujillo regime has been to consider it a major triumph for the OAS. Leftist as well as Communist press--at least in Cuba,

25X1

Venezuela, and Chile--saw the resolution as a victory not only over Trujillo, however, but also over the United States.

Mexico and Chile responded immediately to the OAS resolution by breaking diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, although each had been reported prior to the San Jose meeting as reluctant to follow such an OAS directive. Panama and Guatemala have also broken diplomatic relations with Ciudad Trujillo. Even prior to the meeting, Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Honduras, Uruguay, and Costa Rica did not maintain normal relations with the Trujillo regime. Other Latin American governments may be waiting until after the required OAS notification to the United Nations of the proposed sanctions.


25X1

25X1

25X1

The Situation in the Congo

Katanga President Tshombé has taken advantage of Lumumba's retreat from his attacks on the UN to express "confidence" in the UN and to reiterate the independence of Katanga. Tshombé probably regards the Security Council consensus in favor of Hammarskjold as strengthening his hand with respect to Lumumba; his statement that he has "consulted" with anti-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congo confederation suggests that he still favors this means of resolving the Katanga crisis.



In Leopoldville, Lumumba continues concerned over possible unrest. Congolese officials reportedly suspect collusion between Tshombé and elements in the former French Congo. New rumors of support for Tshombé from President Youlou in Brazzaville appear to have been stimulated by the forced landing in Luluabourg of a Belgian airliner en route from

25X1

Brazzaville to Elisabethville with a group of anti-Lumumba Congolese.

Elsewhere there are press reports that General von Horn, who commands UN forces in the Congo, may be replaced by Finnish General A. E. Martola. Von Horn has been under severe criticism by Premier Lumumba and by some Western observers; his removal, following the replacement of UN representative Bunche, would indicate that Hammarskjold plans a major reorganization of the UN group in the Congo. General Martola was active in organizing the UN Emergency Force during the Suez crisis.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Situation in Laos

Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi, leader of the counter-coup forces, appear to have agreed on 23 August to a set of broad principles to guide their efforts to reach a settlement. After his two-hour meeting with Phoumi in Savannakhet, Souvanna in characteristic fashion announced that "all" political and military problems were settled and that the situation would soon return to "normal." [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

The first order of business would be the reunification of the military command structure, after which the National Assembly would reconvene in Luang Prabang to decide upon the fate of the rival regimes.]

25X1

The forthcoming negotiations between the two sides will be extremely delicate and could break down over any of a number of points. [The proposed reunification of the military command structure poses particularly difficult problems. Not only must the status of Kong Le be clarified, but also the relative power positions of the army's major leaders, including Phoumi, must be redefined. It is by no means certain that Phoumi will accept any diminution in the preeminent role he played in army affairs prior to the coup by Kong Le, a demand likely to be made by Kong with the support of General Ouane and other senior officers in Vientiane.]

The ability of Ouane and his associates to bring Kong Le and his paratroopers under control will be of critical importance if a negotiated settlement with Phoumi is to be reached. His efforts in this direction have to date met with little success.

25X1

The Souvanna-Phoumi "understanding" came amidst indications of growing tension in Vientiane. The arming of local partisans, instigated by Kong Le, was continuing and may even have been accelerated by reports reaching the capital that two of Phoumi's battalions had reached Paksane, about 100 miles from Vientiane on the road from southern Laos. [Kong's paratroopers were proceeding with their establishment of a defense perimeter, and there are unconfirmed reports that the Pathet Lao were taking over outlying posts evacuated by army elements loyal to Kong which were possibly being pulled back into the paratroopers' defense perimeter.] The effect, if any, of the Souvanna-Phoumi accord on these preparations is as yet undiscernible.

The American Embassy in Vientiane believes that Souvanna's decision to meet Phoumi in Savannakhet may have been motivated by the realization that the situation was deteriorating and that the Pathet Lao were appearing to be the only beneficiaries. The embassy further believes that Souvanna may have come to the conclusion that he needs Phoumi as much as or more than Phoumi needs him if the country is going to hold together.

Prince Souphannouvong, titular leader of the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat party, has broadcast an appeal over the clandestine Pathet Lao radio calling for full national support of the regime of his half-brother, Souvanna. This is Souphannouvong's first known public statement since his escape from jail last June.

25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00075A005200470001-2

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP79T00075A005200470001-2

TOP SECRET